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[VOL. IX

RENEWAL OF PROCESS AND THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS
Neel v. Webb Fly Screen Mfg. Co.'
Plaintiff-appellant sued defendant-appellee in the Superior Court of Baltimore City on September 10, 1941,
two days before the expiration of the three-year statute
of limitations. The suit was one of more than three thousand brought in Baltimore city by the statutory liquidator
of Keystone Indemnity Exchange against local policyholders for the collection of an assessment which had been
decreed by a Pennsylvania court. A writ of summons was
issued and returned "non est" to the October rule day.
After automatic renewals by the clerk to the November
and December rule days, the writ was renewed upon
application of the plaintiff to the January 1942 rule day.
Each time it was returned "non est." The suit then lay
dormant for more than three years until, in May 1945,
upon application of the plaintiff for renewal of the writ,
it was issued and served. Defendant's fifth plea stated
that the final renewal was more than three years after the
original cause of action arose and also more than three
years after the return "non est" of the last previous renewal of summons. The plaintiff's demurrer to this plea
was overruled, the parties entered into an agreed statement of the facts, and the lower court entered judgment
for the defendant. On appeal, the judgment was reversed
and a judgment was entered for the plaintiff.
The question presented by the case is whether a writ
of process twice returned non est may lie dormant indefinitely until renewed upon request of the plaintiff, in
view of the provisions of Section 305 of Article 4 of Flack's
Code of Public Local Laws of Maryland of 1930. This law,
which became effective in Baltimore City2 April 3, 1864

reads as follows:

"On the return of an original writ, not executed in
either of said courts, the same may be renewed, returnable to the next return day thereafter, and after
two returns of any original writ not executed at the
two succeeding return days after the writ is first issued, the same shall be permitted to lie dormant, re148 A. 2d 331 (Md. 1946).
'Char. and Pub. Loc. L. of Baltimore City (1938)

Sec. 397.

19481

NEEL v. SCREEN MFG. CO.

newable only on the written order of the Plaintiff or
his attorney of record to such future return day as the
said plaintiff or his attorney may elect, and upon a
further return if not executed, said writ shall be again
permitted to lie, renewable only as aforesaid, the said
plaintiff or his attorney having the right to renew said
writ to as many subsequent return days, under the
same mode of procedure as may be deemed proper,
until the same is executed."
In overruling the plaintiff's demurrer to defendant's
plea of limitations, the lower court held it necessary that
a writ of summons be kept active by renewals to successive return days in order that the commencement of a suit
may relate back to the impetration of the original writ. It
reasoned that if a writ of summons be allowed to become
dormant or inactive through failure to renew to successive return days, a request for subsequent renewal is
equivalent to the commencement of a new suit and, therefore, opens the way for a defendant to plead limitations.
The Court of Appeals ruled to the contrary. It found
that the statute, when considered in the light of common
law precedents as well as contemporaneous and long continued construction, permitted a plaintiff to let his suit remain on the records indefinitely without regular renewal
of the writ. It further held that the legislature had not intended to change the common law rule to the effect that
the first asking of the writ tolls the statute of limitations,
and it adopted the view that the purpose of the provision
in question had been merely to relieve both the clerk and
the plaintiff of the burden of constant renewals, while
saving the effect upon the statute of limitations of the original commencement of the suit. The appellee had contended that such a construction would operate to keep alive
stale demands-in fact, would permit a case to continue
forever-and hence was contrary to the familiar doctrine
that there should be an end to litigation. Although recognizing some persuasion in this argument, the Court of Appeals felt that the effect and apparent intent of the statute
could not be avoided by judicial construction at this late
date.
This case serves to point up the fact that, under the
identical language of the several Maryland statutes which
govern service of process, it is possible to evade both the
spirit and the letter of the statute of limitations in cases
where circumstances permit long delay before finally ef-
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fecting service of process. From 1894 to 1914, the procedure in question applied only to Baltimore City. In 1914
the same provisions were made applicable to the circuit
courts of all counties of Maryland and these provisions
are now codified as Section 154 of Article 75 of the Code.
Under previous practice at common law, as described in
Logan v. State,3 it was necessary that writs of summons be
regularly and uninterruptedly renewed from term to term
until the defendant was served in order that the impetration of the original writ could be deemed the commencement of the suit. 'The earlier case of Hazlehurst v. Morris
et al.,4 . had established that omission so to renew the writ
would operate as a discontinuance. Accordingly, the Logan
case held that if the defense of limitations had not accrued
at the time of the impetration of the first writ, continued
renewals at each succeeding term would serve to prevent
the running of the statute of limitations. Statutory enactments in 1864, 1886, and 1888 did not change the common
law in this respect; they merely established more frequent- and finally monthly-"return days" in lieu of the
thrice yearly "term days." Therefore, until the Act of 1894
there was no option for a plaintiff to skip a renewal day
without suffering a discontinuance and opening the way
for limitations to again run. As already set out above, this
act placed upon the Clerk of the Court the obligation to
issue two renewals as a matter of course and provided that
thereafter the writ should be permitted to lie dormant
until renewed by the plaintiff.
In arriving at its interpretation of the statute in the
case under review, the Court of Appeals felt impelled to
recognize that the plain import of the word "dormant" is a
"condition of sleeping and not of death." The Court also
placed considerable weight on the almost contemporaneous
construction placed on this Act by the most eminent authority in the State on pleading and practice. Mr. Poe,
as early as 1897 had remarked concerning the Act of 1894:
"The object of this act was to save the costs of constant renewal, without losing the legal effect upon the statute of
limitations of the original suit." 5
The appellee, in commenting on the interpretation to
be placed upon Mr. Poe's suggestion, contended that the
legislature could not possibly have intended to grant the
plaintiff the perpetual right to keep his action alive. He
39 Md. 177, 190 (1874).
' 28 Md. 67 (1867).
0

5

2 PoE,

PIMADING AND PRACTICE

(1925) Sec. 67.
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argued that if appellant's view of his rights were correct
this section of the act would in effect permanently arrest
the operation of the statute of limitations with respect to
cases of this type and that only plain and unambiguous
language should permit a statutory construction in derogation of a common law right. In meeting this objection the
Court of Appeals pointed out that under the common law
it was likewise possible to keep a demand alive forever
by renewing the writ each term. The Court could also
have noted that under English and American common law
practice it was generally not necessary to issue successive
writs between the original and final writ, but these might
be connected by continuances, that is, entries of the award
of fictitious writs. However, in Maryland this practice was
not fully applicable, since a docket entry was required for
every writ.6
Today, in most American jurisdictions other than Maryland, there are procedures which serve by one means or
another to place a limitation upon the time within which
service of process must be made or which require, at the
least that plaintiffs take action periodically to prevent a
discontinuance as to defendants not served. While the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure T provide no limitation,
as such, on the time during which process may issue, it
has been suggested that service must be made within a
reasonable time after filing of the complaint, otherwise a
delay may operate as a cause for a discontinuance or dismissal.8 Some District Courts have adopted local rules
providing for an actual limitation on time for service. 9
In most states, a timely writ which serves to toll limitations may be kept alive through the use of alias and pluries
writs. In general, process must be continuous and failure
to renew it from time to time until service is finally made
results in a discontinuance. 10 Still other states provide a
limit upon the time within which service or substituted
service must be finally effected. In some states an alias

a Cf.,

EVANS, MARYLAND CoMMoN LAW PRACTICE (1839) 104.
Rules of Civ. Proc. 3, 4 and 41(b).
0 See, Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civ. Proc.,
Nov. 1937. See also, Schram v. Roppin, E. D. Mich. (1940) 3 FRS 3.2
Case 1; and Schram v. Costello. E. D. Mich. (1940) 4 FRS 3.2 Case 1.
IE. D. NY. Civil Rule 1 (1938). 1 F. R. S. (Rules) ; S. D. NY. Civil
Rule 1 (1938), 1 F. R. S. (Rules) ; N. D. NY. Civil Rule 1 (1940), 2 F. R. S.
(Rules) ; N. C. Rule 1 (all districts) (1939) 2 F. R. S. (Rules) ; E. D. Va.
Civil Rule 2 (1938), 1 F. R. S. (Rules) ; Kansas, Rule 17 (19-), 5 F. R. S.
(Rules).
10 27 C. J. S. DIsMISSAL AND NONSUIT, sec. 75; 1 C. J. S. ACTIONS, see.
7Fed.

129(c) ; 37 C. J. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS, sec. 488: 50 C. J. PROCESS, secs.

49, 50.
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writ is grantable only by leave of court for good cause
shown, which places upon plaintiff the burden of showing
due diligence in attempting to effect service. Present
English practice is also to require leave of the court to
effect periodic renewals after the expiration of the twelvemonths period for which an original writ of summons may
remain in force."
In summary, it appears that in no other state might a
plaintiff go so far as in Maryland today, where under
Article 75, Section 154 and the several identical or similar
local laws, plaintiff is permitted to let a timely writ of
process twice returned "non est" lie dormant indefinitely
until he again choses to request a renewal. The real objection to this result is that plaintiff is not subjected to any
requirement of due diligence in making service. In effect,
the objectives of the statute of limitations can be defeated
if a plaintiff in some opportune case should find it to his
advantage to wait for years before finally bringing a defendant into court.
Of course, the likelihood of such a situation arising is
small. Moreover, plaintiffs are generally anxious to get
service promptly. That the question arose only after fifty
years of practice under the statute may be some indication
that there is no pressing need for changing the rule. Also,
it may be said in favor of the present practice that it saves
both time and fees in effecting service of process. It probably further serves as a safeguard against defendants
who successfully avoid service of process over substantial
periods of time.
It is suggested that service of process might be more
easily had if a form of substituted service were provided,2
such as by private process servers or by registered mail,
for all cases where it is known that the defendant is within
the jurisdiction of the Court but can not be reached
through ordinary channels. Although no constitutional
question is presented, there is no form of substituted ser11 20 HALSBuRYs, LAWS Or ENGLAND (2d ed. 1937), Limitation of Actions,
Part IX, see. 1086; 26 HALSBURYS, LAWS OF ENGLAND (2d ed. 1937), Practice and Procedure, Part I, see. 35; THE ENGLISH AND EMPIRE DIGEST
(1932), Pleading, Practice and Procedure, Part X; Rules of the Supreme
Court, Ord. VIII, R. 1, 2, 3.
12 See, Code of Public Local Laws of Maryland (1938), Art. 4, Sec. 716
(as amended by Ch. 137, Acts of 1939), providing for service of summons,
issued from the Peoples Court of Baltimore City, by registered mail with
return receipt.
House Bill No. 652 was introduced on March 10, 1947, to provide for
service of process upon defendants or respondents by registered mail, but
it failed to pass.
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vice" in any court of record in the State of Maryland except on non-resident motorists" for causes of action arising
in this State and corporations doing business in the State. 5
MARRIAGE PERFORMED BY TELEPHONE INVALID
Fleet v. Fleet'
The plaintiff, a member of the armed forces, was stationed in Oklahoma, and, being alerted for overseas service, could not return to Baltimore, Maryland. It was his
desire to do so to wed the defendant, who had given birth,
out of wedlock, to the plaintiff's child in May, 1943. It was
arranged between the parties that they be married by telephone, with the plaintiff in Oklahoma and the defendant
in Baltimore, Maryland. The defendant procured a license
in Baltimore on February 5, 1944, and on February 7,
1944, the parties conversed with one another by telephone
and the minister in Baltimore read the marriage ceremony
to the parties, to the plaintiff in Oklahoma over the telephone, with the defendant standing beside the minister
in Baltimore. The marriage was never consummated. On
the contrary, when the plaintiff did return home, he found
the defendant again pregnant, and she confessed that the
plaintiff was not the father of the prospective child. The
plaintiff then filed a bill asking for a divorce a vinculo
matrimonii on the ground of adultery, or, in the alternative, for an annulment of the purported marriage on the
ground that it was void ab.initio.
The Court granted an annulment of the purported marriage, saying that a marriage by telephone could not be
valid in Maryland. The Court decided to apply the law
of Maryland to the problem of whether or not this was a
valid marriage, and in doing so found that it was not. To
constitute a lawful marriage in this state, it is necessary
to have a religious ceremony in addition to the civil contract between the parties, and a proper religious ceremony
necessarily contemplates the presence of both parties be1 Equity rule 10A permits notice by registered mail to defendants in
divorce cases (see, Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, Sec. 167) as does the recently
enacted rule of the Court of Appeals upon makers of confessed judgment
notes (Baltimore Daily Record, Nov. 20, 1947). These two instances, however, can be distinguished by the very nature of the case, as the Court
has in rem or in personam jurisdiction and the service by registered mail
is merely a form of notice that action is being taken.
1, Md. Code Supp. (1943) Art. 66%, Sec. 106.
15 Md. Code (1939) Art. 23, Sec. 111.
2

Ct. Ct. No. 2 of Baltimore City, Baltimore Daily Record, October 23, 1946.

